Carbon tax or cap-and-trade: Which is more viable for Chinese remanufacturing industry? by Hu, Xu et al.
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
ScholarWorks @ UTRGV 
Information Systems Faculty Publications and 
Presentations 
Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship 
1-10-2020 
Carbon tax or cap-and-trade: Which is more viable for Chinese 
remanufacturing industry? 
Xu Hu 
Xidian University 
Zhaojun Yang 
Xidian University 
Jun Sun 
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, jun.sun@utrgv.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/is_fac 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hu, Xu; Yang, Zhaojun; and Sun, Jun, "Carbon tax or cap-and-trade: Which is more viable for Chinese 
remanufacturing industry?" (2020). Information Systems Faculty Publications and Presentations. 4. 
https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/is_fac/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Information Systems Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, 
please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu. 
  1 / 34 
 
Carbon tax or cap-and-trade: Which is more viable for chinese remanufacturing industry? 
Abstract: The debate between cap-and-trade and carbon tax, two major carbon emission reduction 
mechanisms to deal with global warming, has been going on for years unsettled. The strategy to 
implement one of them or both is by far mainly addressed at the national level, and there is a need 
to customize the policy-making for different sectors, especially the emerging remanufacturing 
industry that has the great potential to reduce material and energy consumptions. Based on a 
closed-loop supply chain model, this study analyzes the tradeoffs between carbon tax and 
cap-and-trade with a series of numerical studies. While keeping carbon emissions under control, 
cap-and-trade demonstrates a better fit to remanufacturing: its performances on manufacturer profit, 
social welfare, and consumer surplus surpass carbon tax’ in nine, eight, and six out of nine groups 
respectively. Only when the carbon quota level is too high, the cap-and-trade is possible to lose. In 
addition, this study examines two government-to-enterprise-subsidy (G-to-E-S) strategies, direct 
subsidy and policy bias, and find both helpful but almost no difference in their impacts. The 
findings yield useful insights into the industry-wise design of carbon emission reduction 
mechanisms for remanufacturing and similar sectors. 
Keywords: carbon regulations; carbon tax; cap and trade; remanufacturing industry; greenhouse 
gas policies. 
1 Introduction 
Global warming threatens the future of all humanity, and the current international consensus is 
to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide. The global carbon reduction 
plan began with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997, which stipulates that more 
than 30 countries will achieve carbon reduction targets of 5.2% or more in 2008-2012. Both the 
Copenhagen Accord in 2009 and the Paris Agreement in 2015 are pushing countries around the 
world to adopt quantitative and effective emission reduction plans by 2020. Till the end of 2018, 55 
jurisdictions around the world have established carbon taxes and/or emissions trading systems 
(ETSs), but none of them include all the sectors, leading to a merely 42.5% coverage of carbon 
emission sources (Haites, 2018). 
The European Union (EU) launched Phase III of ETS during 2013-2020. Before that, many EU 
members had already taken actions: Finland, Poland, and Denmark introduced carbon tax by 1992; 
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Switzerland established its ETS in 2008, and Iceland adopted carbon tax in 2010. The United States 
established its regional greenhouse gas initiative in 2008. In Canada, the Alberta greenhouse gas 
reduction program was introduced in 2007, and the British Columbia carbon tax 
shift/revenue-neutral carbon tax was enacted in 2008. The two North American countries also 
explored emission reduction mechanisms together: the two ETS established in California and Quebec 
in 2013 began joint auctions in November 2014. In Asia, Japan established ETSs in Tokyo (2010) 
and Saitama (2011) and imposed carbon tax in 2012, while South Korea established an ETS in 
January 2015 (Haites, 2018). 
As the world’s factory, China is also actively reducing carbon emission and engaging in 
sustainable development. In 2009, the Chinese government announced an emission reduction pledge 
to reduce carbon emission per unit of GDP by 40-45% in 2020 compared with 2005 (Zhang, 2011). 
After the Paris Agreement, China proposed to reduce carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65% 
by 2030 compared with 2005 (Kong, Zhao, Yuan et al., 2019). Taking the lead in this new trend, 
China has explored cap-and-trade since 2013 with several pilots in large cities (Zhou & Li, 2018), 
which led to a fully-operational nationwide system based in Shanghai (Song, Liang, Liu et al., 2018). 
This cap-and-trade system features the free allocation of carbon quotas to enterprises, which may sell 
or purchase extra quotas based on actual emissions (L. W. Liu, Chen, Zhao et al., 2015).  
Whereas the cap-and-trade system encourages enterprises to reduce emissions autonomously, the 
carbon tax provides a supplementary option for companies that are not part of the system (Goulder & 
Schein, 2013). For this sake, China is to implement both at the national level. So far the 
cap-and-trade system mainly covers the industries of high carbon emissions (e.g., thermal power), 
and it is still up to others to decide which one to adopt (Z. Liu, Guan, Douglas et al., 2013). In 
particular, remanufacturing is an emerging but fast-developing industry that alleviates environmental 
deterioration and resource depletion with material recycling and reuse (W. J. Liu, Zhang, Jin et al., 
2017). To reduce resource consumptions and waste emissions, enterprises dissemble, resemble 
and/or refurbish used products. The government strongly encourages enterprises to engage in 
remanufacturing with subsidies and consumers to purchase remanufactured products with financial 
incentives for trading in old for new. It is believed that cap-and-trade is beneficial to the 
remanufacturing industry (Chai, Xiao, Lai et al., 2018), but its performance in comparison with 
carbon tax is still unclear. 
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Recently, researchers pay attention to the trade-offs between cap-and-trade and carbon tax. Carl 
and Fedor (2016) investigated the generation of public revenues through cap-and-trade and carbon 
tax. For the power industry, C. Y. Liu (2017) advocated cap-and-trade due to the fact that 
carbon-intensive (dirty) energy is heavily subsidized worldwide, making carbon tax relatively 
ineffective. In order to help policy-makers choose suitable emission-control mechanisms, Wood 
(2018) elaborated on the pros and cons of cap-and-trade and carbon tax. Kosnik (2018) found that 
cap-and-trade received more positive media attention than carbon tax in the US over decades. Ritter 
and Zimmermann (2019) established a two-period, non-cooperative equilibrium of an n-countries 
policy game, and found that carbon tax outperforms cap-and-trade in terms of carbon leakage. At the 
industry level, however, there is a lack of research on carbon policy selection, especially for 
remanufacturing. 
From the enterprise perspective, researchers usually focus on the relationship between 
production decisions and carbon regulations, such as the manufacturing and transportation 
outsourcing in supply chains under single and multiple carbon regulations (Li, Su, & Ma, 2017), 
economic order quantity (EOQ) with cap-and-trade and carbon tax (He, Zhang, Xu et al., 2015), and 
joint production and pricing of multiple products in each scenario (Xu, Xu, & He, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the impacts of different carbon policies on enterprises are yet to be examined. In 
particular, it is not clear whether the emerging remanufacturing industry should choose cap-and-trade 
or carbon tax. This study attempts to answer the question by comparing their effects on this 
environment-oriented industry along with two government-to-enterprise-subsidy (G-to-E-S) policies: 
direct subsidy and policy bias. The investigation based on mathematical simulation yields insight 
into the optimal policy portfolio for the remanufacturing industry. 
This study may contribute to the literature in both theory and practice. It establishes a 
double-closed-loop supply chain model of cap-and-trade and carbon tax in the context of 
remanufacturing to compare their impacts on manufacturer profit, consumer surplus, social welfare 
and carbon emissions under different G-to-E-S strategies. The findings from mathematical modeling 
inform government policies and enterprise decisions to promote the new industry’s healthy 
development. The model setup is based on China’s remanufacturing for illustrative purpose, but the 
method can be easily adapted to other industries and countries. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. It first reviews the extant literature on 
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remanufacturing, government subsidy, and carbon regulation. The understanding leads to the 
establishment of mathematical models to compare carbon tax and cap-and-trade strategies. 
Equilibrium analyses reveal their different impacts on economic performance and environmental 
performance. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed, followed by the 
conclusion. 
2 Research background 
2.1 Remanufacturing 
The trade-in and remanufacturing of used products help enterprises gain competitive 
advantages from consumer recognition, price differentiation, and market niching (Atasu, Sarvary, 
& Wassenhove, 2008). Based on the Majumder-Groenevelt model (Majumder & Groenvelt, 2001), 
Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) compared the optimal production planning and pricing strategies of 
manufacturers between new products and remanufactured products in monopoly and duopoly 
situations. On this basis, Ferrer discussed the situation in which the utility and price of 
remanufactured goods are different from new ones (Ferrer, 2010). In addition, Ferguson and 
Toktay (2010) set up a double-cycle model and discusses the best recovery strategy of original 
entrusted manufacturers (OEMs) considering market competition threats from remanufactured 
products. 
Choi, Li, and Xu (2013) examined two modes of closed-loop supply chains in the 
remanufacturing industry and pointed out that the one led by retailers are more efficient than the 
other led by recyclers. Yin, Li, and Tang (2015) considered the fact that retailer-led channels 
involve trade-in for the optimal pricing of two successive-generation products. Zhu, Wang, Wang 
et al. (2017) also took trade-in into account when comparing two policy options: subsiding 
donations and subsidizing resales. Yet this essential element has not been incorporated into the 
modeling of remanufacturing. For instance, Ferguson and Toktay (2010) posited that the purchasing 
behavior of consumers is affected by remanufacturing without addressing the difference that trade-in 
policies make. When Choi, Li, and Xu (2013) focused on the channel leadership selection in closed 
loop supply chains, they did not pay attention to trade-in as well. 
Ray, Boyaci, and Aras (2011) suggested that the trade-in strategy affects the purchases of 
regular customers, and thus has an impact on the profitability of entire remanufacturing supply 
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chains. In 2012, China launched a trade-in subsidy policy, which allows consumers to return used 
products to their manufacturers and buy new products at favorable prices. Keeping abreast with the 
current situation in China, this study responds to the call by Ray, Boyaci, and Aras (2011) to consider 
trade-in policies in remanufacturing closed-loop supply chains. 
2.2 Government subsidy 
Most existing studies on remanufacturing supply chains, including those in the previous 
subsection, did not examine the impacts of government subsidies. Mitra and Webster (2008) 
indicated that government subsidies enhance the marketability of remanufacturing products, as their 
lower prices make them more competitive than new products. Y. X. Wang, Chang, Chen et al. (2014) 
compared different subsidy strategies in remanufacturing, and found that initial subsidies are suitable 
for the start-up development stage, product and R&D subsidies are conducive to the scalability and 
stability of continuous development, and recycling subsidies help solve the raw material bottleneck. 
The findings corroborate the analyses by L. Wang and Chen (2013) on the subsidy strategies with 
end-of-life vehicle (ELV) remanufacturing. 
Rahman and Subramanian (2012)’s research indicated that government subsidies have great 
impacts on the decision-making, performance, and structure of a remanufacturing supply chain. Ma, 
Zhao, and Ke (2013) pointed out that the subsidies to consumers largely shape the two-channel 
closed-loop supply chain in remanufacturing. Shu, Peng, Chen et al. (2017) compared the carbon tax 
approach with the direct subsidy on the effects of trade-in-old-for-new subsidies to enterprises from 
four aspects: enterprise profit, social welfare, consumer satisfaction, and carbon emission. 
In summary, government subsidies have great impacts on the remanufacturing industry from 
both enterprise and consumer aspects in terms of how they make decisions. In this sense, it is 
necessary to consider government subsidies in the investigation of the closed-loop supply chain 
involved in trade-in-old-for-new remanufacturing. 
2.3 Carbon regulations 
Carbon regulations are rarely considered in existing studies on remanufacturing, though they 
play indispensable roles in greenhouse gas emission reduction. Montgomery (1972) first proposed 
the concept of carbon trading, and Laffont and Tirole (1994) discussed the details of setting up a 
carbon market. In addition, Nordhaus (1992) showed that a proper level of carbon tax is able to slow 
down global warming. For a better understanding of carbon regulations in the context of 
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remanufacturing, it is helpful to examine and compare cap-and-trade and carbon tax in terms of 
current status and future development. 
In a cross-sectional study on carbon trading markets, Hua, Cheng, and Wang (2011) found that 
when both order cost and carbon emission are taken into account, the order quantity of an enterprise 
is likely to be smaller than that of another following the traditional economic order quantity (EOQ) 
model but larger than that of another targeting the lowest carbon emission. Nong, Meng, and 
Siriwardana (2017) used the MONASH Green model to evaluate Australia's ETS, and the results 
showed that ETS facilitates the country’s transition to a low-carbon economy without a significant 
economic impact. Since the establishment of cap-and-trade pilot projects in China, researchers have 
examined the system in terms of their design, implementation, and policy (Jiang, Xie, Ye et al., 2016). 
Du, Ma, Fu et al. (2015) pointed out that the cap-and-trade system enables nonprofit environmental 
protection organizations to grow and make more contribution to the reduction of carbon emissions. 
Carbon tax is a more direct approach to deal with global warming as the policy brings about an 
immediate reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Chai, Xiao, Lai et al., 2018; Wittneben, 2009). 
However, it is somewhat controversial as the dynamic integrated climate economy (DICE) model 
shows that the dramatic cut-down of production hurts the economy (Nordhaus, 1992). Lin and Li 
(2011), Kuo, Hong, and Lin (2016), and Allan, Lecca, Mcgregor et al. (2014) analyzed the efficiency 
of carbon tax in northern Europe, Taiwan, and Scotland, and found that it reduces greenhouse gas 
emissions to a certain extent but an excessive taxation is economy-unfriendly. Metcalf (2009) 
proposed the use of carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and offset the 
existing environmental taxation with the proceeds to strike a balance in tax neutrality. Similarly, 
(Diamond & Zodrow, 2018) found that carbon tax revenue yields positive impacts on gross domestic 
production (GDP), investment, consumption, and labor supply in the long run when it is used to 
reduce payroll tax, but negative impacts when it is used to reduce the national debt or refunded to 
households. Corradini, Costantini, Markandya et al. (2018) proposed another way of using carbon tax 
revenue to fund the research and development of new energy technologies, which accelerate the 
transition to a low-carbon economy at lower social and economic costs. 
As cap-and-trade or carbon tax alone is not optimal in all circumstances, the coexistence of both 
is advocated (Goulder & Schein, 2013). Recent Chinese data showed that optimal carbon tax rate can 
cut emissions up to 62.5% for some sectors, but not enough for overall reduction as the percentages 
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are only 0.03% for the service sector and 2.02% for the manufacturing sector (Wesseh & Lin, 2018). 
Whereas carbon tax takes effects quickly, carbon trading is more efficient in the long run in terms of 
economic benefit and social recognition (Camila, Amalia, Maria et al., 2018). Shi, Yuan, Zhou et al. 
(2013) made a comparative analysis and concluded that the coexistence strategy strikes a balance 
between carbon tax and cap-and-trade in terms of emission reduction and enterprise cost. Thus, it is 
suggested that China implement both, giving cap-and-trade the priority over carbon tax until the 
country develops a more mature carbon emission reduction capability (Cao & Wang, 2015; Wu, Qian, 
& Tang, 2014). 
Though the dual-track strategy is advantageous at the national level, a single approach, 
cap-and-trade or carbon tax, should be adopted at the enterprise level to avoid redundant 
responsibilities (Zeng, 2017). In 2017, China established a national carbon trading market, which 
only explicitly included the power industry. The Center for Energy and Environmental Policy 
Research (CEEP) advocated that enterprises with annual carbon dioxide emission over 26000 tons 
(equivalent to 10,000 tons of standard coal) be included in the carbon market, and the others be 
levied carbon tax (BJX, 2018). In contrast, the carbon emissions are more evenly-distributed among 
remanufacturing enterprises, and this study focuses on the industry-wise strategy. 
3．Modeling and solution 
To examine the effectiveness of cap-and-trade and carbon tax in the remanufacturing 
closed-loop supply chain, this section establishes mathematical models to compare their impacts on 
economic and environmental performances considering trade-in and government subsidies. An 
enterprise in the industry typically produces both new and remanufactured products, which are 
perceived differently in terms of cost and quality by consumers. Thus, the modeling cannot be based 
on popular game theory approaches that accommodate two players but focus on one competitive 
advantage strategy at a time, such as Hotelling model targeting lower cost and Cournot model 
targeting product differentiation. To handle both price competition and product differentiation 
between new and remanufactured products in the remanufacturing industry, the models developed in 
this study assume that there exists one “general” manufacturer for each line of products. This 
scenario applies to the market segmentation in which consumers have strong product type/brand 
preferences (e.g., Android vs. Apple phones). 
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3.1 Basic model 
3.1.1Descriptions 
There is one manufacturer in the market that produces both new and remanufactured products 
and recycles used products. The government subsidizes consumers who trade in old for new from the 
manufacturer with discounted prices. In the basic model, the government adopts the emission permit 
system, and the manufacturer bears no carbon emission cost. Fig.1 illustrates the closed-loop supply 
chain in the basic model. 
 
Fig.1. Closed-loop supply chain in the basic model. 
Consumers are divided into new customers and regular customers. The new customer had never 
purchased a manufacturer's product before, the regular customers have purchased products and own 
the used products. Assume that all customers are fully rational and seek to maximize the utility of 
expenditure. Table 1 lists the main notations in subsequent mathematical models. 
  
New 
Customers 
Regular 
Customers 
OEM Government 
Emission credit 
Trade-in subsidy 
New/remanufactured 
products 
Forward flow Reverse flow Capital flow Information flow 
Used products 
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Table 1. Main notations. 
Notations Definitions 
𝐵/𝑁/𝑇  Basic model/model-N/model-T 
𝑃𝑛/𝑃𝑟   The sale price of new/remanufactured products 
𝑣  The recycling price of a used product 
𝐶𝑛/𝐶𝑟  Manufacturing cost of new/remanufactured products 
𝑞𝑛
𝑖  /𝑞𝑟
𝑖   Sales volume of new/remanufactured product that purchased by customers i 
𝑞𝑣  The whole sales including new and remanufactured product  
𝑠𝑡  The government subsidies to consumers who trade in old for new 
𝑠𝑟  The government subsidies to manufacturers engaging in remanufacturing 
𝛼/1 − 𝛼  The proportion of new/regular customers 
𝜃/𝑡𝜃/𝛿𝜃  The utility of new/remanufactured/used products for consumers 
𝑏  The salvage of the used products 
𝑒𝑛/𝑒𝑟  Carbon emissions of manufacturing new/remanufactured products 
𝑒𝑡  Carbon emission quotas rate 
𝛽𝑒𝑡  The preferential carbon emission quotas rate 
𝑐  Carbon tax rate in model-N/ price of unit carbon emission quota in model-T 
𝜌𝑐  Preferential carbon tax rate 
𝑈𝑛
𝑖/𝑈𝑟
𝑖   The utility of customer i buying a new/ remanufactured product 
𝜋𝑀  Manufacturer profit  
𝐶𝐸  Carbon emission from manufacturing 
𝐶𝑆/𝑆𝑊   Consumer surplus/Social welfare 
 
3.1.2 Consumer choices 
Before making purchases, consumers compare all the options and choose the ones that 
maximize the utility. All consumers have three choices: buy new products, buy remanufactured 
products, or no buy. For regular customers, they can trade in old for new when they buy new or 
remanufactured products. According to Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) and Ferrer (2010), the utility 
that the consumer obtains through buying behavior is as follows: 
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a) When a new consumer chooses to buy a new product, the utility derived is 𝑈𝑛
𝛼 = 𝜃 − 𝑃𝑛. 
b) When a new consumer chooses to buy a remanufactured product, the utility derived is 𝑈𝑟
𝛼 =
𝑡𝜃 − 𝑃𝑟. 
c) When a new consumer chooses to buy neither, the utility is 0. 
d) When a regular consumer chooses to trade in an old product for a new one, the utility derived is 
𝑈𝑛
1−𝛼 = 𝜃 − 𝑃𝑛 + 𝑣 + 𝑠𝑡 − 𝛿𝜃. 
e) When a regular consumer chooses to trade in an old product for a remanufactured one, the utility 
derived is 𝑈𝑟
1−𝛼 = 𝑡𝜃 − 𝑃𝑟 + 𝑣 + 𝑠𝑡 − 𝛿𝜃. 
f) When a regular consumer chooses to buy neither, the utility is 0. 
This study explores the policy options for reducing carbon emissions of the remanufacturing 
industry. Other than the remanufacturing sales volume of 0, the sales can then be determined, as 
summarized in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. When 𝑃𝑟 ≤ 𝑡𝑃𝑛  and (𝑡 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑛 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑟 + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑣 + 𝑆𝑡) > 0 , the whole sales 
𝑞𝑣 = 1 −
𝛼𝑃𝑟
𝑡
− (1 − 𝛼)
𝑃𝑟−𝑣−𝑠𝑡
𝑡−𝛿
, the sales of new products purchased by new customers is 𝑞𝑛
𝛼 =
𝛼 (1 −
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
), the sales of remanufactured products that purchased by new customers are 𝑞𝑟
𝛼 =
𝛼 (
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
−
𝑃𝑟
𝑡
), the sales of new products that purchased by regular customers are 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 = (1 −
𝛼) (1 −
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
), and the sales of remanufactured products that purchased by regular customers are 
𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼 = (1 − 𝛼) (
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
−
𝑃𝑟−𝑣−𝑠𝑡
𝑡−𝛿
). 
3.1.3 Optimal enterprise decisions 
In the basic model, the manufacturer profit can be formulated as: 
𝜋𝑀
𝐵 = (𝑃𝑛 − 𝐶𝑛)(𝑞𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼) + (𝑃𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟)(𝑞𝑟
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) − (𝑣 − 𝑏)(𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) (1) 
The profit of the manufacturer consists of new product revenue, remanufacturing product 
revenue, and recovery cost. Solving the first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing manufacturer 
yields the equilibrium prices as summarized by Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. In the basic model, when 𝐶𝑟 ≤ 𝑡𝐶𝑛 and (𝑡 − 𝛿)𝐶𝑛 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐶𝑟 + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑏 + 𝑆𝑡) ≥ 0, 
the equilibrium price for new products is 𝑃𝑛
𝐵∗ =
1+𝐶𝑛
2
, the equilibrium price for remanufactured 
products is 𝑃𝑟
𝐵∗ =
𝑡+𝐶𝑟
2
, and the recovery price for used products is 𝑣𝐵∗ =
𝑏+𝛿−𝑠𝑡
2
. 
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In 𝑃𝑟
𝐵∗ =
𝑡+𝐶𝑟
2
, t is positively correlated with 𝑃𝑟
𝐵∗, the parameter 𝑡 represents the degree of 
consumer acceptance of remanufactured products. With the increase of 𝑡, the gap between the utility 
obtained from the remanufactured product and that from the new product decreases. When 𝑡 = 1, the 
utility obtained from the remanufactured product and that from the new product are equal. 
In 𝑣𝐵∗ =
𝑏+𝛿−𝑠𝑡
2
, the business also benefits when the government subsidizes consumers. The 
utility of used products 𝛿 is positively correlated with the recycling price. The higher the utility 
evaluation of the used product, the higher the expected recycling price, and the less likely the 
consumer is to participate in the recycling. Representing the salvage of the used products, parameter 
𝑏 is also positively correlated with the recycling price. The higher salvage value of used products, 
the stronger incentive the manufacturer has to recycle them. 
On the basis of Lemma 2, the equilibrium sales can be determined. A sensitivity analysis is done 
to make sense of the main parameters, as summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Sensitivity analysis of main parameters in the basic model. 
 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗ 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗ 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
 
𝐶𝑛 ↗/𝐶𝑟 ↗ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ 
𝑠𝑡 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↗ 
𝑡 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ 
𝛼 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ 
𝛿 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↘ 
𝑏 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↗ 
a) As the 𝐶𝑛(𝐶𝑟) increases, the sales of remanufactured (new) product increase too. The increase in 
the manufacturing cost of new (remanufactured) products will lead to the loss of consumers 
purchasing new (remanufactured) products, who will buy remanufactured (new) products 
instead. 
b) The subsidy to consumers, 𝑠𝑡, is only positively correlated with the volume of remanufactured 
products purchased by regular customers, 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
. A higher trade-in subsidy enhances the 
purchase intention of regular customers who originally choose neither new nor remanufactured 
products. However, it does not change the extant preferences of other regular customers, as the 
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increase shifts the utilities of new and remanufactured products to the same extent. Fig.2 shows 
the effect of increasing trade-in subsidy on the utility evaluation of regular customers. 
 
Fig.2. The influence of higher trade-in subsidy on the sales. 
Regular customers who have relatively high evaluations of new product utility between 
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
 
and 1 tend to buy new products. Regular customers who have relatively low evaluations of new 
product utility between 
𝑃𝑟−𝑣−𝑠𝑡
𝑡−𝛿
 and 
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
 tend to buy remanufactured products. The remaining 
regular customers choose to buy neither. When the trade-in subsidy is increased to 𝑠𝑡
′, regular 
customers whose evaluations of new product utility between 
𝑃𝑟−𝑣−𝑠𝑡
′
𝑡−𝛿
 and 
𝑃𝑟−𝑣−𝑠𝑡
𝑡−𝛿
 tend to buy 
remanufactured products rather than nothing. 
For the same commodity, consumers evaluate its value: those giving higher evaluation tend to 
buy new products, those giving lower evaluation prefer remanufactured products, and those 
giving the lowest evaluation are unlikely to make the purchase. When the government subsidy 
increases, the cost of obtaining remanufactured products decreases, and the consumers with the 
lowest evaluation may choose remanufactured products. 
c) The salvage of used products 𝑏 is only positively correlated with the volume of remanufactured 
𝑃𝑛 − 𝑃𝑟
1 − 𝑡
 
𝑃𝑟 − 𝑣 − 𝑠𝑡
𝑡 − 𝛿
 
𝑃𝑟 − 𝑣 − 𝑠𝑡
′
𝑡 − 𝛿
 
Buy 
new 
Buy 
remanufacture
d 
No buy 
General subsidy Higher subsidy 
Sales 
Trade-in 
subsidy 
1 
0 
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products purchased by regular customers, 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
. The higher the salvage, the higher the 
recycling price, and the stronger incentives for manufacturers and consumers to participate in 
recycling. 
d) The parameter, 𝑡, represents the degree of consumer acceptance of remanufactured products. 
With the increase of 𝑡, the gap between the utility obtained from the remanufactured product 
and the new product narrows, and remanufactured products get more preference. 
e) 𝛿 is positively correlated with the recycling price. The higher the utility evaluation of the used 
product, the higher the expected recycling price, and the less likely the consumer is to participate 
in the recycling. 
3.2 Carbon tax 
3.2.1 Descriptions 
In model-N, the cost of carbon emission for the manufacturer is no longer 0. The government 
levies a carbon tax at the rate of 𝑐, and each manufacturer needs to pay tax for the emission from 
production. Fig.3 shows the closed-loop supply chain in model-N. 
 
Fig.3. Closed-loop supply chain in model-N. 
3.2.2 Optimal enterprise decisions 
Taking carbon tax into account, the manufacturer profit in the model-N can be reformulated as: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑁 = (𝑃𝑛 − 𝐶𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛)(𝑞𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼) + (𝑃𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑟)(𝑞𝑟
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) − (𝑣 − 𝑏)(𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) (2) 
New 
customers 
Regular 
customers 
OEM Government 
New/remanufactured 
products 
Emission credit 
Trade-in subsidy 
Forward flow Reserve flow Capital flow Information flow 
Carbon tax 
Used products 
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The profit of the manufacturer consists of new product revenue, remanufacturing product 
revenue, and recovery cost. Solving the first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing manufacturer 
yields the equilibrium prices as summarized by Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3. In model-N, when 𝐶𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑟 ≤ 𝑡(𝐶𝑛 + 𝑐𝑒𝑛)  and (𝑡 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑛 + 𝑐𝑒𝑛) − (1 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑟 +
𝑐𝑒𝑟) + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑏 + 𝑆𝑡) ≥ 0 , the equilibrium price for new products is 𝑃𝑛
𝑁∗ =
1+𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛
2
, the 
equilibrium price for remanufactured products is 𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗ =
𝑡+𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟
2
 and the equilibrium recycling 
price is 𝑣𝑁∗ =
𝑏+𝛿−𝑠𝑡
2
. 
On the basis of Lemma 3, the equilibrium sales can be determined, and the sensitivity analysis is 
done to make sense of the main parameters, as summarized in table 3. 
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis of main parameters in model-N. 
 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗ 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
 
𝐶𝑛 ↗/𝐶𝑟 ↗ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ 
𝑠𝑡 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↗ 
𝑡 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ 
𝛼 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ 
𝛿 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↘ 
𝑏 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↗ 
𝑐 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ 
𝑒𝑛 ↗/𝑒𝑟 ↗ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ 
As shown in Table 3, the sensitivity of most parameters is the same as the basic model, and the 
newly appeared parameter 𝑐 is interpreted here. The increase of parameter 𝑐 will lead to a decrease 
in the sales of new products and an increase in the sales of remanufactured products. The imposition 
of carbon tax forces enterprises to join the remanufacturing industry for lower carbon emissions. 
3.3 Cap-and-trade 
3.3.1 Descriptions 
In model-T, an emission trading system (ETS) regulated by the government is established. At 
the beginning of each year, manufacturers get free allocations. If a manufacturer’s emission exceeds 
its allocation, it needs to purchase more from others through the ETS. If a manufacturer’s emission is 
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less than its allocation, it can sell the remaining on the ETS. Fig.4 shows the closed-loop supply chain 
in model-T.  
 
Fig.4. Closed-loop supply chain in model-T. 
3.3.2 Optimal enterprise decisions 
In the model-T, the manufacturer purchases or sells allocation at price c. The manufacturer 
profit can be reformulated as: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑇 = (𝑃𝑛 − 𝐶𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛 + 𝑐𝑒𝑡)(𝑞𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼) + (𝑃𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑡)(𝑞𝑟
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼)
−(𝑣 − 𝑏)(𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) (3)
 
The profit of the manufacturer consists of new product revenue, remanufacturing product 
revenue, and recovery cost. Solving the first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing manufacturer 
yields the equilibrium prices as summarized by Lemma 4. 
Lemma 4. When 𝐶𝑟 + 𝑐(𝑒𝑟 − 𝑒𝑡) ≤ 𝑡(𝐶𝑛 + 𝑐(𝑒𝑛 − 𝑒𝑡)  and  (𝑡 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑛 + 𝑐𝑒𝑛) − (1 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑟 +
𝑐𝑒𝑟) + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑏 + 𝑆𝑡 + 𝑐𝑒𝑡) ≥ 0, the equilibrium price for new products is 𝑃𝑛
𝑇∗ =
1+𝐶𝑛+𝑐(𝑒𝑛−𝑒𝑡)
2
, 
the equilibrium price for remanufactured products is 𝑃𝑟
𝑇∗ =
𝑡+𝐶𝑟+𝑐(𝑒𝑟−𝑒𝑡)
2
 and the recycling price is 
𝑣𝑇∗ =
𝑏+𝛿−𝑠𝑡
2
. 
On the basis of Lemma 4, the equilibrium sales can be determined. As shown in Table 4, the 
sensitivity of all the parameters remains the same as the basic model, except for the newly appeared 
New 
customers 
Regular 
customers 
OEM Government 
Trade-in subsidy 
New/remanufactured 
products 
Emission credit 
ETS 
Used products 
Trading credit Regulate 
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parameter 𝑒𝑡. When 𝑒𝑡 increases, the sales of new products are not likely to change, but the sales of 
remanufactured products will increase. 
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis of main parameters in model-T. 
 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗ 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗ 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
 
𝐶𝑛 ↗/𝐶𝑟 ↗ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ 
𝑠𝑡 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↗ 
𝑡 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ 
𝛼 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ 
𝛿 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↘ 
𝑏 ↗ ⟶ ⟶ ⟶ ↗ 
𝑐 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ 
𝑒𝑛 ↗/𝑒𝑟 ↗ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ ↘/↗ ↗/↘ 
𝑒𝑡 ↗ ⟶ ↗ ⟶ ↗ 
4. Equilibrium analysis 
4.1 Carbon tax versus cap-and-trade 
Carbon tax and cap-and-trade are compared from manufacturer, consumer, social welfare, and 
environment performance aspects. Examined in four observations, key indicators include equilibrium 
price for new/remanufactured products, sales of new/remanufactured products, manufacturer’ profit, 
carbon emissions, consumer surplus and social welfare. 
Observation 1. Manufacturers prefer cap-and-trade to carbon tax for higher remanufactured product 
sales and profits. 
𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗ = 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗, 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
= 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
. Sales of the new product are the same in model-T and 
model-N. 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗ > 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗, 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
> 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
. Remanufactured product sales increase in model-T 
but new product sales stay put, indicating that cap-and-trade motivates remanufacturing at a higher 
degree. To the same extent, the prices of new and remanufactured products decrease and the utilities 
that consumers derive from all buying options increase. Existing consumers who have purchased 
new or remanufactured products will stick to the same choice, but new consumers will choose the 
remanufactured. 
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Observation 2. Cap-and-trade typically outperforms carbon tax in emission reduction. 
The carbon emissions can be formulated as: 
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑒𝑛(𝑞𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼) + 𝑒𝑟(𝑞𝑟
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) (4) 
More remanufactured products are sold in model-T, leading to a larger amount of carbon 
emission in total (𝐶𝐸𝑁 − 𝐶𝐸𝑇 < 0). Compared with new products, of course, remanufactured ones 
have much lower emission per product. Nevertheless, the overall carbon emission in model-T has a 
cap, over which the extra allowance can be bought from other enterprises. Thus, it makes sense to 
measure the carbon emission in model-T by quota: 
𝐶𝐸𝑇 = 𝑒𝑡𝑞𝑣
𝑇 (5) 
When 𝑒𝑡 <
−𝑏−√𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
, the carbon emission of a manufacturer in model-T is lower; when 𝑒𝑡 >
−𝑏−√𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
, it is higher. As long as the allocation of free quota is kept within a reasonable range, 
cap-and-trade largely guarantees lower carbon emission. 
Observation 3. Consumers prefer cap-and-trade as they pay less for both new and remanufactured 
products. 
𝑃𝑛
𝑇∗ < 𝑃𝑛
𝑁∗, 𝑃𝑟
𝑇∗ < 𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗ and 𝑣𝑇∗ = 𝑣𝑁∗. In model-T, new and remanufactured products can be 
sold at lower prices, which means companies will attract more consumers. 
Consumer surplus is the difference between the maximum price consumers are willing to pay 
and the actual price they pay. In this study, consumers’ willingness to pay is evenly distributed 
between 0 and 1, and the consumer surplus can be determined by means of integral. As 𝐶𝑆𝑇 > 𝐶𝑆𝑁, 
consumer surplus is larger in model-T. 
𝐶𝑆 = ∑ (∫ 𝜃 𝑑𝜃
𝑞𝑖
𝑗
0
− 𝑃𝑖𝑞𝑖
𝑗
)
𝑖=𝑛,𝑟 
𝑗=𝛼,1−𝛼
(6) 
Observation 4. Social welfare increased when cap-and-trade is adopted. 
Social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and enterprise profit: 
𝑆𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋𝑀 (7) 
In model-T, both manufacturer profit and consumer surplus increase from more remanufactured 
products made and sold, leading to higher social welfare. Thus, cap-and-trade promotes 
remanufacturing in terms of emission reduction, consumer surplus, and manufacturer profit more 
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than carbon tax. 
4.2 Government-to-enterprise-subsidy (G-to-E-S) 
In addition to consumer-side subsidization, governments may offer subsidies to enterprises for 
remanufacturing in form of G-to-E-S. On the basis of model-N, two G-to-E-S strategies are 
introduced: remanufacturing preferential carbon tax and direct remanufacturing subsidies, calling 
them N1 and N2 separately. In N1, remanufactured products enjoy preferential carbon tax rate ρ𝑐, 
where 0 < 𝜌 < 1. In N2, the unit remanufactured product gets a subsidy 𝑠𝑟. The solutions of N1 
and N2 is the same as model-N. On the basis of model-T, two G-to-E-S strategies are introduced: 
remanufacturing preferential quotas and direct remanufacturing subsidies, calling them T1 and T2 
separately. In T1, remanufactured products enjoy preferential quotas β𝑒𝑡, where 𝛽 > 1. In T2, the 
unit remanufactured product gets a subsidy 𝑠𝑟. The solutions of T1 and T2 are the same as model-T. 
Table 5 observes the performance of N1, N2, T1, and T2. 
Table 5. Comparison between two G-to-E-S strategies. 
Comparing conditions 
Model-T versus T1, T2 Model-N versus N1, N2 
(𝛽 − 1)𝑐𝑒𝑟 ≥ 𝑠𝑟  (𝛽 − 1)𝑐𝑒𝑟 ≤ 𝑠𝑟  (1 − 𝜌)𝑐𝑒𝑟 ≥ 𝑠𝑟  (1 − 𝜌)𝑐𝑒𝑟 ≤ 𝑠𝑟  
𝑃𝑛/𝑣 T = T1 = T2 N = N1 = N2 
𝑃𝑟/𝑞𝑛
𝛼/𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 T ≥ T2 ≥ T1 T ≥ T1 ≥ T2 N ≥ N2 ≥ N1 N ≥ N1 ≥ N2 
𝐶𝐸 T ≥ T1 ≥ T2 T ≥ T2 ≥ T1 N ≥ N1 ≥ N2 N ≥ N2 ≥ N1 
𝑞𝑟
𝛼/𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼/𝜋𝑀/𝐶𝑆/𝑆𝑊 T1 ≥ T2 ≥ T T2 ≥ T1 ≥ T N1 ≥ N2 ≥ N N2 ≥ N1 ≥ N 
Note: N represents model-N and T represents model-T. 
The comparison is based on the same subsidy intensity. The effects of the two subsidy strategies 
are very similar, as detailed below.  
a) Both G-to-E-S strategies drive down the price of remanufactured products and enhance their 
competitiveness. 
b) Both G-to-E-S strategies restrain the new product business but promote the remanufacturing 
business. 
c) Both G-to-E-S strategies reduce carbon emissions and increase corporate profit, consumer 
surplus, and social welfare. 
d) The more subsidies, the lower the prices of remanufactured products, the larger the sales volume, 
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the greater the carbon emission, enterprise profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. 
5. Numerical study 
A numerical study is conducted to explore the policy options for reducing carbon emissions of 
the remanufacturing industry, as it is hard to obtain real data from enterprises. To avoid the 
meaningless sales volume of 0, the constraints, 𝑃𝑟 ≤ 𝑡𝑃𝑛 and (𝑡 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑛 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑃𝑟 + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑣 +
𝑆𝑡) > 0, are established in Lemma 1. Under the condition that the constraints are met, the effect of 
carbon emission quotas rate 𝑒𝑡 and carbon tax rate 𝑐 on the manufacturer profit, carbon emission, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare are examined in model-T. The numerical setting is as follows: 
𝐶𝑛 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑡 = 0.7, 𝛼 = 0.4, 𝑠𝑡 = 0.2, 𝑒𝑛 = 0.4, 𝑒𝑟 = 0.2, 𝜌 = 0.5, 𝑏 = 0.1, 𝛿 = 0.3, 𝑠𝑟 =
0.05. In order to simulate the real situation where the carbon tax rate is fixed and the carbon price 
can be changed, parameter c in model-N is fixed to 0.5 but variable in model-T. Fig.5 indicates that 
model-T exhibits better economic performance, especially when 𝑒𝑡 is bigger. 
 
Fig.5. The influence of carbon emission quotas rate on economic performance. 
Fig.6 reveals that the carbon emission in model-T typically lower when 𝑒𝑡  is under a 
reasonable level. Only when 𝑒𝑡 exceeds a relatively high level (around 0.4), the carbon emission in 
model-N becomes lower. At a reasonable carbon quota level in the real world, it is rare to see the 
lower carbon footprint of model-N. 
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Fig.6. The influence of carbon emission quotas rate on carbon emission. 
Basically, Fig.5 and Fig.6 illustrate the analyses in Section 4. In addition, this study explores the 
influence of carbon price on model-T. Sets 𝑒𝑡 = 0.3, Fig.7 and Fig.8 simulate the influence of c on 
the economic performance and carbon emission of model-T respectively. Fig.7 suggests that higher 
carbon prices lead to lower economic performance, making the economic performance of model-T 
better when the carbon price is relatively low. From the perspective of carbon emissions, both 
manufacturers and consumers bear the responsibility. As the increase in carbon price leads to higher 
production cost, manufacturer profit as well as consumer surplus will decline. Not always a bad thing, 
however, a higher carbon price stimulates manufacturers and consumers to choose greener options.  
 
Fig.7. The influence of carbon tax rate on the economic performance (𝑒𝑡 = 0.3). 
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Fig.8 reveals that the higher the carbon price, the greater the carbon emission in a big enough 
𝑒𝑡; but completely opposite when e is small, and the carbon emission in model-T is always lower in 
the low carbon price. In particular, when 𝑒𝑡 = 0.2, the carbon price loses the ability to regulate 
carbon emission. If 𝑒𝑡 is higher than 𝑒𝑟, the quota obtained for remanufactured products exceeds 
their production needs, resulting in quota surplus. The increase of carbon price will increase the 
value of quota, which urges manufacturers to gain more benefits by increasing the output of 
remanufactured products. Only when 𝑒𝑡 > 0.2 and the carbon price is high, the carbon emission in 
model-T is higher.  
 
Fig.8. The influence of carbon tax rate on carbon emission. 
The results of the numerical study are consistent with the analyses in Section 4. When carbon 
tax is equal to the carbon price, model-T can bring better economic performance (enterprise profit, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare), but carbon emission is not always the lowest. When the quota 
coefficient exceeds the threshold, the carbon emission of model-T will exceed that of model-N. In 
addition, the carbon price has a negative effect on economic performance, and the impact of the 
carbon price on carbon emission varies when the quota coefficient takes different values. 
According to the base setting, we conduct another 2𝑘  factory experiment with 𝑘 = 3, where 
three levels for the carbon tax rate is 0.2, 0,4 and 0,6, and three levels for the carbon emission quotas 
rate is 0.1, 0,2 and 0.3. Presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix, the numerical results 
generated from the nine cases are consistent with the managerial findings in this section.  
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6. Lessons learned elsewhere 
The mathematical analyses are based on the situation of one country in which neither ETS nor 
carbon tax has been implemented for the remanufacturing industry, as in the case of China and most 
other developing countries. For a more comprehensive understanding of emission control designs, 
this study examines the existing systems all over the world. Table 6 and Table 7 compare 12 
representative carbon tax systems and 10 representative cap-and-trade systems, respectively. 
The proportion of emissions covered by each jurisdiction ranges from 11 percent to 85 percent. 
The carbon tax and ETS systems in most industrialized countries still have a large space for further 
development. For instance, Switzerland implements both cap-and-trade and carbon tax but achieves 
merely 46 percent. Similar to China that targets the thermal power industry in building its national 
ETS, the carbon tax and ETS systems of most jurisdictions cover energy-intensive sectors, mainly 
power generation, aviation, manufacturing, transportation, and heating. Though the remanufacturing 
industry is yet to be covered, it is closely related to the traditional manufacturing sector. 
One issue facing the remanufacturing industry is how to handle the situation in which an 
enterprise may be required to pay a carbon tax and purchase emission quotas at the same time if both 
are implemented in a country. In the EU, its ETS overlaps with many members’ carbon tax in various 
sectors, and these countries exempt carbon tax from relevant enterprises. Norway, for example, 
grants tax exemptions for operations covered by EU’s ETS. For emerging economies like China to 
establish emission-control mechanisms for the remanufacturing industry and the related 
manufacturing sector, it is important to avoid double levies. 
In the ETS pilots of China, fewer than 10 percent allocations are auctioned through the systems 
but more than 90 percent are allocated free to enterprises by the government. Countries launching 
similar pilot projects take the same approach, such as in the case of South Korea. Some jurisdictions 
that implemented ETSs earlier are doing the opposite. In Alberta, for instance, 100 percent of 
allocations are auctioned. The electric sector of the EU also takes the full auction approach. 
Meanwhile, other countries are exploring more flexible carbon policies. Swiss and Mexico allow 
large industrial emitters to opt out of carbon tax and switch to cap-and-trade. This kind of flexibility 
allows enterprises to choose an optimal carbon emission reduction system, as Observation 1 shows 
in this study. If similar flexible carbon policies are launched for remanufacturing, enterprises may 
make a choice between carbon tax and cap-and-trade following the findings of this study. 
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Table 6. 12 representative carbon tax systems. 
Jurisdiction Year 
launched 
Price August 2017 
US$/tCO2 
Proportion of emission 
sources covered (%) 
Emissions covered by the 
instrument MtCO2e 
Coverage Opt out of carbon tax 
Finland 1990 69-73 36 21 Fossil fuels (electricity and commercial aviation 
excluded) 
 
Norway 1991 4-56 60 32 Oil, gasoline and natural gas 
 
Sweden 1991 140 42 23 Fossil fuels (only heating and transport) 
 
Denmark 1992 27 45 22 Oil, natural gas, coal, and waste incineration 
 
British 
Columbia 
2008 24 70 43 70-75% of the provincial anthropogenic emissions, 
almost every sector 
 
Switzerland 2008 87 35 5 Fossil fuels (only heating and power generation) Allowed (for large 
emitters only) 
Ireland 2010 24 33 20 Natural gas, oil, and solid fuels 
 
Iceland 2010 12 55 3 Diesel, gasoline, oil and liquid petroleum gas 
 
Japan 2012 3 70 926 Fossil fuels (agriculture, fishing, domestic aviation, 
and railways excluded) 
 
United 
Kingdom 
2013 24 25 127 Fossil fuels (only power generation on Great Britain) 
 
France 2014 36 40 185 Natural gas, oil, and coal (only transport and heating) 
 
Mexico 2014 1-3 46 332 Fossil fuels that exceed the carbon intensity of natural 
gas 
Allowed (for large 
emitters only) 
Note: ETSs in Switzerland and Mexico allow large emitters to opt out of carbon tax for carbon quota. 
Sources: Haites (2018) and Carl and Fedor (2016) 
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Table 7. 10 representative cap-and-trade systems. 
Jurisdiction Year 
launched 
Price August 
2017 US$/tCO2 
Proportion of emission 
sources covered (%) 
Emissions covered by 
the instrument MtCO2e 
Coverage Allocation 
European Union 2005 6 45 1,939 Electric power sector, energy-intensive 
industrial sectors, and aviation 
Electric sector (all through 
auctions), industrial sectors (30% 
free), aviation (85% free) 
Alberta 2007 24 45 123 Emitters exceeding 100,000 tons annually All through auctions 
New Zealand 2008 13 51 41 Economic sectors Free allocation and government 
window sales 
Switzerland 2008 7 11 17 Large, energy-intensive industrial emitters 30% free (2020), power sector (all 
through auctions) 
RGGI(USA) 2009 4 21 86 Power plants greater than 25MW in capacity 9% free 
Japan 2010 14 19 17 Lager energy users Nearly 100% free 
California 2013 15 85 375 Manufacturers and power plants exceeding 
25,000 tons annually 
Industrial (90% free), electricity, 
natural gas, and motor fuel 
distributors (all through auctions) 
Quebec 2013 15 85 68 Emitters exceeding 25,000 tons annually Industrial (90% free), natural gas 
and motor fuel distributors (all 
through auctions) 
China 2013 1-8 35-60 1,144 Emitters exceeding 25,000 tons annually More than 90% Free 
South Korea 2015 18 68 470 Power generation and airlines; manufacturers 
exceeding 100,000 tons annually 
100% free 
Note: Japan’s ETS includes Tokyo and Saitama; Chin’s ETS includes Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Hubei. 
Sources: Haites (2018) and Carl and Fedor (2016) 
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7. Conclusion 
This study establishes a single-cycle closed-loop supply chain and analyzes the optimal 
decisions of a remanufacturer under carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies. It compares their 
economic performance and environmental performance in the context of trade-in and consumer 
subsidy with different models. In addition, the modeling takes two government-to-enterprise-subsidy 
(G-to-E-S) policies, direct subsidy, and policy bias, into account. The findings yield helpful insights 
for the government to formulate carbon policies for the remanufacturing industry and useful 
guidance for enterprises to cope with government carbon regulations. 
Researchers posit that cap-and-trade benefits remanufacturing (Chai, Xiao, Lai et al., 2018). 
This study further shows that carbon tax is also helpful, but typically not as much as cap-and-trade, 
especially when the sector is still at the development stage. The major findings include: 
(a) Generally, cap-and-trade has a better fit with remanufacturing than carbon tax. In most cases, 
cap-and-trade wins in economic performance whereas carbon tax is not considered very 
economy-friendly. As for the overall environmental performance, cap-and-trade outperforms 
carbon tax in terms of emission reduction as long as the cap is kept under a reasonable level 
by the government. Thus, cap-and-trade is in a better position to help the remanufacturing 
industry become more environment-friendly and promote the transformation of enterprises 
to cleaner production.  
(b) When remanufacturing enterprises undertake efforts to reduce carbon emissions through 
either cap-and-trade or carbon tax, G-to-E-S helps them further optimize business processes 
and increase the production of remanufactured products, which means less pollution and 
cleaner production. The models developed to compare direct subsidy and policy bias 
provide insights on how the government should implement G-to-E-S under different carbon 
policies. 
(c) When an emission trading system (ETS) already exists, it is better off to implement 
cap-and-trade for the remanufacturing industry with a relatively low carbon quota price. 
Otherwise, carbon tax is a viable option. 
The findings provide helpful insights for China and comparable countries to design carbon 
emission reduction policies for the remanufacturing industry and similar sectors with great cleaner 
production potential. Other countries with similar economic development, Brazil and India for 
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example, can refer to the findings in this study in their implementation of carbon emission reduction 
systems. Countries that recently established ETSs similar to that in China, such as South Korea and 
New Zealand, may also find the insights from the comparison between carbon tax and cap-and-trade 
helpful for promoting cleaner production.  
At the enterprise level, this study examines whether it is worthwhile for an organization to opt 
out of carbon tax for carbon quota when it has a choice. The results suggest that it is a viable option 
for large emitters in countries that implement both carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems, like 
Mexico and Switzerland. Although this study focuses on remanufacturing, one cleaner production 
sector, the general findings are also applicable to other industries where traditional and sustainable 
operations coexist. Establishing ETSs for those sectors and subsiding green products are conductive 
to the reduction of carbon emissions.  
This study has limitations that point to future research directions. First of all, the mathematical 
models are based on a single cycle, and multiple-cycle models are worth further explorations. In 
addition, the quota setup in carbon trading is specified in accordance with the existing method of 
China's carbon trading system, and the industrial baseline method may be used to make the findings 
more generalizable. Finally, there is a new trade-in-old-for-remanufactured strategy, which can be 
compared with the trade-in-old-for-new strategy in this study. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
For new customers： 
When 𝑈𝑟
𝛼 > 𝑈𝑛
𝛼  and 𝑈𝑟
𝛼 > 0, new customers will choose to buy remanufactured products to maximize the utility. The sales are 
𝑞𝑛
𝛼 = 𝛼 (1 −
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
) and 𝑞𝑟
𝛼 = 𝛼 (
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
−
𝑃𝑟
𝑡
).When 𝑈𝑛
𝛼 > 𝑈𝑟
𝛼  and 𝑈𝑛
𝛼 > 0, New customers will choose to buy new products to 
maximize the utility. The sales are 𝑞𝑛
𝛼 = 𝛼(1 − 𝑃𝑛) and 𝑞𝑟
𝛼 = 0. 
For regular customers: 
When 𝑈𝑟
1−𝛼 > 𝑈𝑛
1−𝛼  and 𝑈𝑟
1−𝛼 > 0, regular customers will choose to buy remanufactured products to maximize the utility. 
The sales are 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 = (1 − 𝛼)(1 −
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
) and 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼 = (1 − 𝛼) (
𝑃𝑛−𝑃𝑟
1−𝑡
−
𝑃𝑟−𝑣−𝑠𝑡
𝑡−𝛿
).When 𝑈𝑛
1−𝛼 > 𝑈𝑟
1−𝛼 and 𝑈𝑛
1−𝛼 > 0, regular 
customers will choose to buy new products to maximize the utility. The sales are 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 = (1 − 𝛼) (1 −
𝑃𝑟−𝑣−𝑠𝑡
𝑡−𝛿
) and 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼 = 0. 
This study explores the policy options for reducing carbon emissions of the remanufacturing industry. Other than the 
remanufacturing sales volume of 0, the sales can then be determined. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. Taking 𝑷𝒏, 𝑷𝒓 and 𝒗 as decision variables, take the derivative of equation (1) and get the Hessian matrix:  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
𝑡 − 1
2
1 − 𝑡
0
2
1 − 𝑡
2
𝑡 − 1
−
2(𝑡 − 𝛼𝛿)
𝑡(𝑡 − 𝛿)
1 − 𝛼
𝑡 − 𝛿
0
1 − 𝛼
𝑡 − 𝛿
2(𝛼 − 1)
𝑡 − 𝛿 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
(8) 
The Hessian matrix is negative, and there is an optimal solution for equation (1) 
{
  
 
  
 
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝐵
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 0
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝐵
𝜕𝑃𝑟
= 0
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝐵
𝜕𝑣
= 0
(9) 
 The optimal solution is 𝑃𝑛
𝐵∗ =
1+𝐶𝑛
2
, 𝑃𝑟
𝐵∗ =
𝑡+𝐶𝑟
2
 and 𝑣𝐵∗ =
𝑏+𝛿+𝑠𝑡
2
. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3. Taking 𝑷𝒏, 𝑷𝒓 and 𝒗 as decision variables, take the derivative of equation (2) and get the Hessian matrix: 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
𝑡 − 1
2
1 − 𝑡
0
2
1 − 𝑡
2
𝑡 − 1
−
2(𝑡 − 𝛼𝛿)
𝑡(𝑡 − 𝛿)
1 − 𝛼
𝑡 − 𝛿
0
1 − 𝛼
𝑡 − 𝛿
2(𝛼 − 1)
𝑡 − 𝛿 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) 
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The Hessian matrix is negative, and there is an optimal solution for equation (2) 
{
  
 
  
 
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑁
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 0
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑁
𝜕𝑃𝑟
= 0
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑁
𝜕𝑣
= 0
(11) 
 The optimal solution is 𝑃𝑛
𝑁∗ =
1+𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛
2
, 𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗ =
𝑡+𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟
2
 and 𝑣𝑁∗ =
𝑏+𝛿+𝑠𝑡
2
. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4. Taking 𝑷𝒏, 𝑷𝒓 and 𝒗 as decision variables, take the derivative of equation (3) and get the Hessian matrix: 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
𝑡 − 1
2
1 − 𝑡
0
2
1 − 𝑡
2
𝑡 − 1
−
2(𝑡 − 𝛼𝛿)
𝑡(𝑡 − 𝛿)
1 − 𝛼
𝑡 − 𝛿
0
1 − 𝛼
𝑡 − 𝛿
2(𝛼 − 1)
𝑡 − 𝛿 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
(12) 
The Hessian matrix is negative, and there is an optimal solution for equation (3) 
{
  
 
  
 
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑇
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 0
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑇
𝜕𝑃𝑟
= 0
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑇
𝜕𝑣
= 0
(13) 
 The optimal solution is 𝑃𝑛
𝑇∗ =
1+𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝑐𝑒𝑡
2
, 𝑃𝑟
𝑇∗ =
𝑡+𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑡
2
 and 𝑣𝑇∗ =
𝑏+𝛿+𝑠𝑡
2
. 
 
Proof of Table 2. Substituting the optimal pricing into the equation of demand, the optimal demand can be derived, as shown 
below:𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗ = 𝛼 (
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
), 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗ = α
𝑡𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
, 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
= (1 − 𝛼)(
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
) and𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
= (1 − 𝛼)
(𝑡−𝛿)𝐶𝑛−(1−𝛿)𝐶𝑟+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
. 
Derivatives of different variables can be solved by the demand function. 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
= −
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
=
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
= −
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
=
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0; 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
=
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
= −
𝛼
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
<
0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
=
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
= −
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛿)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
< 0 ; 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 ,
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 ,
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
=
1−𝛼
2(𝑡−𝛿)
> 0 ; 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝑡
=
−
𝛼(𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)2
< 0 ,
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝑡
=
𝛼(𝑡2𝐶𝑛+(1−2𝑡)𝐶𝑟)
2𝑡2(1−𝑡)2
>
𝛼(𝑡2𝐶𝑟+(1−2𝑡)𝐶𝑟)
2𝑡2(1−𝑡)2
> 0 ,
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝑡
= −
(1−𝛼)(𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)2
< 0 ,
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝑡
=
(𝑡−𝛿)[(𝑡−𝛿)𝐶𝑛−(1−𝛿)𝐶𝑟+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑆𝑡)]
2(𝑡−𝛿)2(1−𝑡)2
+
(1−𝑡)(1−𝛿)[𝐶𝑟−𝑏−𝑆𝑡]
2(𝑡−𝛿)2(1−𝑡)2
> 0 ; 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝛼
=
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝛼
=
𝑡𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝛼
= −
1
2
+
𝐶𝑛−𝐶𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
<
0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝛼
= −
(𝑡−𝛿)𝐶𝑛−(1−𝛿)𝐶𝑟+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
< 0 ; 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝛿
=
(1−𝛼)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡−𝐶𝑟)
2(𝑡−𝛿)2
< 0 ; 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝐵∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝐵∗
𝜕𝑏
=
1−𝛼
2(𝑡−𝛿)
> 0. Where (𝑡 − 𝛿)𝐶𝑛 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐶𝑟 + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑏 + 𝑆𝑡) ≥ 0 and 𝑏 + 𝑠𝑡 − 𝐶𝑟 < 0. 
Proof of Table 3. Substituting the optimal pricing into the equation of demand, the optimal demand can be derived, as shown 
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below: 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ = 𝛼 (
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
) , 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗ = α
𝑡𝐶𝑛+𝑡𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
, 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
= (1 − 𝛼) (
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
)  and 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
= (1 −
𝛼)
(𝑡−𝛿)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛)−(1−𝛿)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟)+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
. 
Derivatives of different variables can be solved by the demand function. 
∂qn
αN∗
∂Cn
= −
α
2(1−t)
< 0, 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
=
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0, 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
= −
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
=
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0; 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
=
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
= −
𝛼
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
<
0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
=
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
= −
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛿)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
< 0 ;  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
=
1−𝛼
2(𝑡−𝛿)
> 0 ;
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑡
=
−
𝛼(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)2
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑡
=
𝛼(𝑡2(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛)+(1−2𝑡)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟))
2𝑡2(1−𝑡)2
>
𝛼(𝑡2(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟)+(1−2𝑡)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟))
2𝑡2(1−𝑡)2
> 0,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑡
= −
(1−𝛼)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)2
< 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑡
=
(𝑡−𝛿)[(𝑡−𝛿)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛)−(1−𝛿)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟)+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑆𝑡)]
2(𝑡−𝛿)2(1−𝑡)2
+
(1−𝑡)(1−𝛿)[𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟−𝑏−𝑆𝑡]
2(𝑡−𝛿)2(1−𝑡)2
> 0 ; 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝛼
=
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝛼
=
𝑡𝐶𝑛+𝑡𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
> 0 ,  
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝛼
= −
1
2
+
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝛼
= −
(𝑡−𝛿)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛)−(1−𝛿)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟)+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
< 0 ; 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝛿
=
(1−𝛼)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟)
2(𝑡−𝛿)2
< 0 ;  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑏
=
1−𝛼
2(𝑡−𝛿)
> 0 ;
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑐
=
−
𝛼(𝑒𝑛−𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑐
=
𝛼(𝑡𝑒𝑛−𝑒𝑟)
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
> 0 ,  
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑐
= −
(1−𝛼)(𝑒𝑛−𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑐
=
(1−𝛼)[(𝑡−𝛿)𝑒𝑛−(1−𝛿)𝑒𝑟]
2(𝑡−𝛿)(1−𝑡)
> 0; 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
= −
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
=
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
= −
(1−𝛼)𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
=
(1−𝛼)𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 ; 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
=
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
= −
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
=
(1−𝛼)𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
= −
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛿)𝑐
2(𝑡−𝛿)(1−𝑡)
< 0 . Where (𝑡 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑛 + 𝑐𝑒𝑛) − (1 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑟) + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑏 + 𝑆𝑡) ≥ 0  and 𝑏 + 𝑠𝑡 −
𝐶𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑟 < 0. 
 
Proof of Table 4. Substituting the optimal pricing into the equation of demand, the optimal demand can be derived, as shown below: 
𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗ = 𝛼 (
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
) , 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗ = α
𝑡𝐶𝑛+𝑡𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟+(1−𝑡)𝑐𝑒𝑡
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
, 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
= (1 − 𝛼) (
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
)  and 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
= (1 −
𝛼)
(𝑡−𝛿)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛)−(1−𝛿)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟)+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡+𝑐𝑒𝑡)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
. 
Derivatives of different variables can be solved by the demand function. 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
= −
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
=
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 ,  
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
= −
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
=
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0;
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
=
𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
= −
𝛼
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
<
0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
=
1−𝛼
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑟
= −
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛿)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
< 0 ; 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 ,  
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
= 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑠𝑡
=
1−𝛼
2(𝑡−𝛿)
> 0 ;
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑡
=
−
𝛼(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)2
< 0 ,
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑡
=
𝛼(𝑡2(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝑐𝑒𝑡)+(1−2𝑡)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑡)+(𝑡+3𝑡
2)𝑐𝑒𝑡)
2𝑡2(1−𝑡)2
>
𝛼(𝑡2(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑡)+(1−2𝑡)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑡)+(𝑡+3𝑡
2)𝑐𝑒𝑡)
2𝑡2(1−𝑡)2
>
0 ,
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑡
= −
(1−𝛼)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)2
< 0 ,
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑡
=
(𝑡−𝛿)[ (𝑡−𝛿)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛)−(1−𝛿)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟)+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑆𝑡+𝑐𝑒𝑡)]
2(𝑡−𝛿)2(1−𝑡)2
+
(1−𝑡)(1−𝛿)[𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟−𝑏−𝑆𝑡−𝑐𝑒𝑡]
2(𝑡−𝛿)2(1−𝑡)2
>
0 ;
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝛼
=
1
2
−
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
> 0,
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝛼
=
𝑡𝐶𝑛+𝑡𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟+(1−𝑡)𝑐𝑒𝑡
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
> 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝛼
= −
1
2
+
𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 ,
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝛼
=
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−
(𝑡−𝛿)(𝐶𝑛+𝑐𝑒𝑛)−(1−𝛿)(𝐶𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑟)+(1−𝑡)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡+𝑐𝑒𝑡)
2(1−𝑡)(𝑡−𝛿)
< 0;
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0, 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝛿
= 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝐶𝑛
=
(1−𝛼)(𝑏+𝑠𝑡+𝑐𝑒𝑡−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟)
2(𝑡−𝛿)2
< 0; 
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑏
=
0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑏
= 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑏
=
1−𝛼
2(𝑡−𝛿)
> 0 ;
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑐
= −
𝛼(𝑒𝑛−𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑐
=
𝛼(𝑡𝑒𝑛−𝑒𝑟+(1−𝑡)𝑒𝑡)
2𝑡(1−𝑡)
> 0 ,  
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑐
=
−
(1−𝛼)(𝑒𝑛−𝑒𝑟)
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑐
=
(1−𝛼)[(𝑡−𝛿)𝑒𝑛−(1−𝛿)𝑒𝑟+(1−𝑡)𝑒𝑡]
2(𝑡−𝛿)(1−𝑡)
> 0;
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
= −
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
=
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0, 
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
= −
(1−𝛼)𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
< 0, 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑛
=
(1−𝛼)𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 ;
𝜕 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
=
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
= −
𝛼𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
< 0 ,  
𝜕𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
=
(1−𝛼)𝑐
2(1−𝑡)
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
𝜕𝑒𝑟
= −
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛿)𝑐
2(𝑡−𝛿)(1−𝑡)
< 0 ;Where 
(𝑡 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑛 + 𝑐𝑒𝑛) − (1 − 𝛿)(𝐶𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑟) + (1 − 𝑡)(𝑏 + 𝑆𝑡 + 𝑐𝑒𝑡) ≥ 0 and 𝑏 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑐𝑒𝑡 − 𝐶𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑟 < 0. 
 
Proof of Observation 1. 
The profits of the manufacturers can be formulated as: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑁 = (𝑃𝑛 − 𝐶𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛)(𝑞𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼) + (𝑃𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑟)(𝑞𝑟
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) − (𝑣 − 𝑏)(𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) (14) 
𝜋𝑀
𝑇 = (𝑃𝑛 − 𝐶𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛)(𝑞𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼) + (𝑃𝑟 − 𝐶𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑟)(𝑞𝑟
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) − (𝑣 − 𝑏)(𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼)
+𝑐𝑒𝑡(𝑞𝑛
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑛
1−𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
𝛼 + 𝑞𝑟
1−𝛼) (15)
 
And the difference between the two profits is: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑇 − 𝜋𝑀
𝑁 =
𝑐𝑒𝑡
2
(𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
) +
𝑡 − 𝐶𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑡
2
(
(1 − 𝛼)𝑐𝑒𝑡
2(𝑡 − 𝛿)
+
𝛼𝑐𝑒𝑡
2𝑡
)
−(𝑣 − 𝑏)
(1 − 𝛼)𝑐𝑒𝑡
2(𝑡 − 𝛿)
(16)
 
Under model-T, the precondition for remanufacturing is that the comprehensive profit of remanufacturing is positive，that is: 
𝑡−𝐶𝑟−𝑐𝑒𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑡
2
− (𝑣 − 𝑏) > 0, it can then be determined that 𝜋𝑀
𝑇 − 𝜋𝑀
𝑁 > 0. 
 
Proof of Observation 2. 
The difference of the carbon emissions in model-T and model-N can be formulated as: 
𝐶𝐸𝑁 − 𝐶𝐸𝑇 = 𝐶𝐸𝑁 − 𝑒𝑡 (𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
) − 𝑒𝑡 (
(1 − 𝛼)𝑐𝑒𝑡
2(𝑡 − 𝛿)
+
𝛼𝑐𝑒𝑡
2𝑡
)      
= 𝐶𝐸𝑁 − 𝑒𝑡 (𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
) − c𝑒𝑡
2
𝑡 − 𝛼𝛿
2𝑡(𝑡 − 𝛿)
(17)
 
Reformulate it as a function of 𝑒𝑡 : 𝐹(𝑒𝑡) = 𝑎𝑒𝑡 + 𝑏𝑒𝑡
2 + 𝑐. Where 𝑎 = −(𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
), 𝑏 = −𝑐
𝑡−𝛼𝛿
2𝑡(𝑡−𝛿)
 
and 𝑐 = 𝐶𝐸𝑁. Obviously, 𝑎 < 0, 𝑏 < 0, 𝑐 > 0, it can then be determined that when 0 < 𝑒𝑡 <
−𝑏−√𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
, 𝐶𝐸𝑁 − 𝐶𝐸𝑇 > 0, when 
𝑒𝑡 >
−𝑏−√𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
, 𝐶𝐸𝑁 − 𝐶𝐸𝑇 < 0. 
 
Proof of Observation 3. 
The difference of the consumers’ surplus in model-T and model-N can be formulated as: 
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𝐶𝑆𝑇 − 𝐶𝑆𝑁 = 𝑒𝑡
2𝑐2 (
1
8𝑡
+
(1 − 𝛼)𝛿
4𝑡(𝑡 − 𝛿)
) + 𝑒𝑡𝑐
{
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ + 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗ + (1 −
𝑡
2(𝑡 − 𝛿)
)𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
2
+
𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗
4
+ 𝛼
𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗ + 𝑡
𝑃𝑛
𝑁∗ − 𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗
1 − 𝑡
− 2𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗
4𝑡
+
1 − 𝛼
(𝑡 − 𝛿)
[
𝑡
2
(
𝑃𝑛
𝑁∗ − 𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗
1 − 𝑡
+
𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗ − 𝑉𝑁∗ − 𝑠𝑡
𝑡 − 𝛿
)− 𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗]
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
(18)
 
See it as a function of 𝑒𝑡 , it can then be determined that when 𝑒𝑡 > 0, CS
𝑇 − CS𝑁 > 0. 
 
Table A1. Results on price and quantity generated by model-N (carbon tax) and model-T (cap-and-trade). 
Parameter  Price  Quantity 
𝑐 𝑒𝑡 
 𝑃𝑛
𝑇∗ 𝑃𝑛
𝑁∗ 𝑃𝑟
𝑇∗ 𝑃𝑟
𝑁∗ 𝑣𝑇∗ 𝑣𝑁∗  𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑇∗ 
 
𝑞𝑛
𝛼𝑁∗ 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑇∗ 𝑞𝑟
𝛼𝑁∗ 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
 𝑞𝑛
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑇∗
 𝑞𝑟
(1−𝛼)𝑁∗
 
0.2  0.1  
 
0.730  0.740  0.485  0.495  0.100  0.100  
 
0.073  0.073  0.050  0.044  0.110  0.110  0.213  0.198  
 
0.2  
 
0.720  0.740  0.475  0.495  0.100  0.100  
 
0.073  0.073  0.055  0.044  0.110  0.110  0.218  0.198  
 
0.3  
 
0.710  0.740  0.465  0.495  0.100  0.100  
 
0.073  0.073  0.061  0.044  0.110  0.110  0.233  0.198  
0.4  0.1  
 
0.760  0.780  0.495  0.515  0.100  0.100  
 
0.047  0.047  0.070  0.059  0.070  0.070  0.238  0.208  
 
0.2  
 
0.740  0.780  0.475  0.515  0.100  0.100  
 
0.047  0.047  0.082  0.059  0.070  0.070  0.268  0.208  
 
0.3  
 
0.720  0.780  0.455  0.515  0.100  0.100  
 
0.047  0.047  0.093  0.059  0.070  0.070  0.298  0.208  
0.6  0.1  
 
0.790  0.820  0.505  0.535  0.100  0.100  
 
0.020  0.020  0.091  0.074  0.030  0.030  0.263  0.218  
 
0.2  
 
0.760  0.820  0.475  0.535  0.100  0.100  
 
0.020  0.020  0.109  0.074  0.030  0.030  0.308  0.218  
 
0.3  
 
0.730  0.820  0.445  0.535  0.100  0.100  
 
0.020  0.020  0.126  0.074  0.030  0.030  0.353  0.218  
Note: 𝐶𝑛 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑡 = 0.7, 𝛼 = 0.4, 𝑠𝑡 = 0.2, 𝑒𝑛 = 0.4, 𝑒𝑟 = 0.2, 𝜌 = 0.5, 𝑏 = 0.1, 𝛿 = 0.3, 𝑠𝑟 = 0.05. 
 
Table A2. Results on economic and environmental performances generated by model-N (carbon tax) and model-T (cap-and-trade). 
Parameter  Economic performance  Environmental performance 
𝑐 𝑒𝑡 
 𝜋𝑀
𝑇  𝜋𝑀
𝑁 𝐶𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝑆𝑁 𝑆𝑊𝑇 𝑆𝑊𝑁  𝐶𝐸𝑇 𝐶𝐸𝑁 
0.2  0.1  
 
0.199  0.103  0.156  0.075  0.355  0.178  
 
0.045  0.201  
 
0.2  
 
0.214  0.103  0.158  0.075  0.372  0.178  
 
0.093  0.201  
 
0.3  
 
0.230  0.103  0.160  0.075  0.390  0.178  
 
0.146  0.201  
0.4  0.1  
 
0.154  0.103  0.104  0.075  0.258  0.178  
 
0.042  0.201  
 
0.2  
 
0.182  0.103  0.108  0.075  0.291  0.178  
 
0.093  0.201  
 
0.3  
 
0.213  0.103  0.113  0.075  0.326  0.178  
 
0.152  0.201  
0.6  0.1  
 
0.112  0.103  0.054  0.075  0.167  0.178  
 
0.040  0.201  
 
0.2  
 
0.151  0.103  0.060  0.075  0.211  0.178  
 
0.093  0.201  
 
0.3  
 
0.195  0.103  0.067  0.075  0.263  0.178  
 
0.158  0.201  
Note: 𝐶𝑛 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑡 = 0.7, 𝛼 = 0.4, 𝑠𝑡 = 0.2, 𝑒𝑛 = 0.4, 𝑒𝑟 = 0.2, 𝜌 = 0.5, 𝑏 = 0.1, 𝛿 = 0.3, 𝑠𝑟 = 0.05. 
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